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Mutiny in Africa, 1950–2018

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Abstract
The majority of literature on civil–military relations has focused on coups d'état. Yet, studying lesser forms of military insubordination can offer valuable insight into the true condition of states' civil–military relations. This paper introduces a data collection effort on mutinies across Africa from 1950 to 2018, revealing several interesting trends. First, most African countries have experienced mutinies, with these events increasing in frequency in the post-Cold War period. Second, while mutinies rarely escalate into coups, they are associated with an increased likelihood of coups in the future. This dataset provides a useful tool to explore the complexity of states' civil–military relations.

Keywords
Africa, coup, civil–military, mutiny

Introduction

On four different occasions in 2017, the government of Côte d'Ivoire was confronted with mutinies from multiple elements of their armed forces. Defined as "an act of collective insubordination, in which troops revolt against lawfully constituted authority for primary goals other than political power," mutinies are distinct from other forms of military disobedience such as coups in that they do not target power, but are quite important events with serious implications for civil–military relations (Dwyer, 2015b; Rose, 1982: 562–563). In the case of Côte d'Ivoire, the initial events began in early January when soldiers seized control of the

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country's second largest city, Bouaké, demanding bonuses, increased pay and improved living conditions. The mutiny quickly spread, striking at least eight additional cities. The following month, soldiers from the Forces Spéciales mutinied in Adiaké, protesting their exclusion from the negotiated agreement which resolved the January mutiny. After two months of relative stability, thousands of active soldiers again took to the streets on the heels of mutineer spokesman Sergeant Fofana's declaration that the mutineers would absolve the government of the remaining payment owed from the negotiated agreement in January (Schiel et al., 2017). In December, a fourth mutiny broke out in Bouaké with soldiers setting up roadblocks and taking control of key areas of the city. The mutiny quickly spread to Abidjan, where shooting and at least one death were reported. The mutineers were the same as those involved in the January mutiny and their demands again centered on unpaid bonuses. After four days an agreement was reached and soldiers returned to their barracks (Monks and Agnero, 2018).

Côte d'Ivoire's most recent spell of mutinies offers a glimpse into the fragility of civil–military relations and the important consequences of these events. For Côte d'Ivoire, the mutinies only ended with the government's costly promise to provide roughly 8,500 soldiers the equivalent of $19,000 each. This was no small amount given the country's per capita GDP at the time was approximately $1,400. The overall direct financial commitment would amount to an estimated $150–160 million, an incredible burden for any country and especially problematic for one with a small economy that—following the collapse of cocoa prices—was already in a pronounced decline.

While fiscal costs alone can be damaging, other countries have seen even more dire outcomes of mutinies. What began as a small, localized mutiny in 2012 Mali, for example, dramatically escalated when Captain Amadou Sanogo and a group of supporters departed the Kati barracks for Bamako, promptly removing the government. It would be difficult to overstate the fallout associated with this mutiny-turned-coup. The event acted as a direct assault on Mali's two-decade democracy and prompted a failed countercoup, leading to the massacre of members of the presidential guard—the Red Berets. Finally, and most importantly, the government disorder following the coup contributed to the loss of half the country's territory to insurgents, prompting an international intervention.

Events such as those seen in 2012 Mali, given the resulting change in government, have received a disproportionate share of scholarly attention. Unfortunately, limited scholarship has focused on the type of event that acted as a precursor to that coup—mutiny. This is a curious gap in the literature, especially considering the important economic, political, and human consequences that mutinies can have. The literature to date has generally focused either on specific historical episodes or on mutiny-plagued sub-regions, limiting our ability to make more general inferences regarding the phenomenon (Dwyer, 2017; Parsons, 2003). Finally, as discussed below, mutinies are increasing in frequency, making it all the more important to better understand this form of military disobedience. The data introduced in this paper are an effort to overcome prior shortcomings, to document the occurrence of mutiny throughout the African continent, and to provide a publicly available tool which scholars can use to further study these important events.

Our data include detailed information on 159 mutinies in Africa from 1950 to 2018. We build on earlier efforts of recording mutinies, in particular the work of Dwyer (2017) on three distinct ways. First, where Dwyer only focused on West and Central Africa, our analysis covers all countries across the continent. Second, compared with prior efforts that focused in West and Central Africa from 1960 to 2014, our coding efforts identified an additional 35

instances of mutiny over the same geographic and temporal coverage (Dwyer 2017). Finally, in addition to the geographic expansion, we expand the temporal period by examining additional years, beginning in 1950 and ending in 2018.[1]

The paper proceeds in six parts. First, building on prior work, we provide a clear definition of mutiny while carefully distinguishing mutinies from other forms of military disobedience such as desertion/defection. Second, we offer details on the types of events included in the data as well as the types we exclude. Third, we provide an in-depth overview of our data gathering and coding procedures. Fourth, we present the resulting data, illustrating both temporal and geographic variation in the occurrence of mutiny, while also distinguishing mutiny trends from those of coups. Fifth, we illustrate the utility of the data by including models that examine mutinies and coups, where we find clear evidence of the distinctiveness of these events. We conclude with a discussion of opportunities for application of the data in future research.

Defining mutiny

Scholars have long been aware of important differences between various aspects of military insubordination. Morrison and Stevenson, for example, drew an explicit distinction between coups and mutinies. Coups they defined as "violence or the threat of it by one or more parts of the power elite against other parts." Mutinies, meanwhile, they described as "violence on the established order by groups which are part of its own instruments of force, such as the police, etc." (Morrison and Stevenson, 1971: 351). Although a useful starting point, subsequent studies have refined these descriptions. Most notably, Dwyer (2015b), building on the prior work of Rose (1982), defines mutiny as "an act of *collective* insubordination, in which *troops* revolt against lawfully constituted authority for *primary goals other than political power*."

We find this definition to be ideal for three specific reasons. First, the collective aspect suggests common grievances shared by actors across a larger group. This makes identifying such events possible and often signals widespread grievances across the military. Second, the definition is explicitly concerned with *troops*, not other elements of authority such as national police forces. This aids in clarifying specific actors as members of a state's armed forces. In line with Dwyer, we only consider cases by active duty troops to be mutinies, also excluding mutinous activities by veterans and demobilized soldiers (Dwyer, 2017). Finally, although coups can be thought of as a form of mutiny, the definition adopted here explicitly requires goals other than seizing power, at least at the event's outset. This distinction is vital as mutinies often underscore collective grievances within the military, but with motives falling short of regime overthrow.

These components are essential as academic attention has disproportionately examined coups at the expense of other types of events. Although important given the stakes, coups are but one form of military insubordination. While their presence or absence can help scholars understand the degree of state stability, analyzing different forms of military disobedience can offer a more accurate depiction of the 'true' condition of states' civil–military relations (Huntington, 1957; Feaver 1999). Failure to consider lesser forms of military disobedience has led scholars to fall victim to the fallacy of 'coupism,' or the inclination to judge a state's civil–military relations solely on its coup activity (Croissant et al., 2010: 954).

Consequently, scholars often ignore the complexity of civil–military relations, overlooking important interactions between soldiers and the state.

The tendency for an overreliance on coups as the primary indicator of the condition of states' civil–military relations is perhaps unsurprising as coups "dramatically symbolize the central problem of the military exploiting their coercive strength to displace civilian rulers" and can lead to severe consequences for the future trajectory of a state (Feaver, 1999: 218). However, mutinies can also have dramatic and long-lasting consequences, making a more systematic investigation of these incidents essential. The following sections describe an effort to address this shortcoming by documenting mutinies across the African continent from 1950 through 2018.

Distinguishing (non-)mutiny

A central challenge in identifying cases of mutiny involved vetting those events that may often be inaccurately labeled as mutiny. In our assessment, we identified at least four distinct categories of events that are often conflated with non-mutinous events. These included military coup attempts, veteran/demobilized soldier mutinies, desertion, and an 'other' events category that for myriad reasons failed to meet our operational criteria for mutiny. Below we briefly clarify our coding decisions while illustrating examples of events that are excluded.

First, we excluded military coup attempts given the distinct differences in goals but do include cases that first began as mutinies. For example, in Côte d'Ivoire on 23 December 1999 approximately 50 soldiers in Abidjan protested the non-payment of bonuses for their participation in the UN peacekeeping mission in Central African Republic (Toungara, 2001). Negotiations ultimately failed, leading to a coup against President Henri Konan Bédié (Arnold 1999; Schiel et al., 2017; Toungara 2001). Given the nature of the soldiers' initial demands and actions, we consider the events beginning on 23 December, and similar type events, to be mutinies that later evolved to become coups.

Other cases, such as a 1992 mutiny in Sierra Leone, were more ambiguous. Often depicted as spontaneous, Dwyer (2017: 110) described this event as an effective bait-and-switch by commanding officers. Owing to hardships on the frontlines in the fight against the Revolutionary United Front, supporters of Valentine Strasser abandoned their posts and set out for the capital of Freetown, ostensibly to mutiny. The 'mutiny' would quickly spiral into a coup. Dwyer's interviews with the participants illustrate that while enlisted soldiers were adamant that they were traveling to the capital to mutiny, with no intention of seizing power, the involved officers portrayed the mutiny plot as a ruse to get enlisted soldiers to participate. Although perhaps a coup plot from the outset, many of the rank-and-file soldiers were convinced that the effort had more limited goals and accordingly, willingly engaged in mutiny. We ultimately include this event owing to the quite overt and collective movement of soldiers from the frontlines to the capital for the explicit purpose of staging a mutiny.[2]

Second, mutinies by inactive soldiers such as veterans and previously demobilized forces are excluded. Such events include the 7 June 2012 mutiny in Angola, which saw upwards of 3,000 demobilized soldiers protest, demanding disability pensions and back pay (De Morais, 2012). The inactive nature of the participants falls short of the definition of mutiny.

Third, we excluded instances where a group of soldiers made the decision to desert/abandon their posts, thereby removing themselves from a state's armed forces. Actions to remove

oneself from the state's armed forces suggest that soldiers are not concerned with directly benefitting from a government's policy change. This stands in stark contrast to the goals of mutiny (Maringira, 2016). Prior data efforts such as the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), have also distinguished between mutiny and desertion.[3] Yet our review of the ACLED data suggests that a variety of forms of insubordination are still frequently conflated. For example, the case description of a mutiny in 2005 Chad notes "dozens of soldiers deserted posts and joined rebel forces" (*Agence France Presse*, 2005). Similar issues arose during our review of The Social, Political, and Economic Event Database (SPEED). For instance, SPEED recorded a mutiny in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in April 1997 (Nardulli et al., 2015), but the alleged mutiny saw soldiers of the 21st brigade desert and claim common cause with the rebels (French, 1997). Rather than organized insubordination with a common policy goal short of attaining political power, such events represent soldiers no longer identifying themselves with the state.

Lastly, we encountered numerous 'other' events, including interpersonal violence and interforce fighting that may often be miscategorized as mutiny. For example, although ACLED codes a mutiny in Uganda on 6 February 1999, the case reflects infighting between police and soldiers (Raleigh et al., 2010). Here, members of the Ugandan Special Constables engaged in a physical confrontation with soldiers over the accidental burning of residential huts. As the actors involved were not active troops, and goals did not include common policy goals, events such as these were not included.

Beginning/end distinction

Following Dwyer's (2017) lead, a single instance of mutiny is recorded when a mutiny begins. This is the case if a mutiny occurs in a single location and lasts one day or if it spreads to multiple cities and continues over multiple days. For instance, the January 2017 mutiny in Côte d'Ivoire spread to as many as eight cities and lasted for two days. This is recorded as a single observation in our data. We code a new event when one mutiny is concluded before a new mutiny begins. This can occur when an agreement is reached, when mutineers return to their barracks, or when mutineers are killed or arrested. The May 1993 mutinies in Central African Republic provide an instructive example. A mutiny on 15 May 1993 lasted one day and concluded with an agreement and mutineers returning to their barracks. Quiet returned to the streets of Bangui for three days before a second mutiny broke out on 19 May (*Agence France Presse*, 1993a, b). Although separated by only four days, we count these as separate mutinies because the first concluded before the second began. This is a unique advantage of our coding efforts as we are able to identify event start dates at the day–month–year level.

Location distinction

As the 2017 January mutiny in Côte d'Ivoire illustrates, mutinies can quickly spread. Thus, we were careful not to conflate the incidence of mutiny with its geographic scope. The ACLED dataset, for example, is a 'location' and 'event' dataset and does an excellent job in identifying the location(s) of various actions (Raleigh et al., 2010). However, users should exercise caution so as to not conflate entries as independent events. For example, Martin's recent assessment of civil–military relations in Côte d'Ivoire reports over 40 mutinous events in the country in 2017 alone (Martin, 2018). Aside from using a far broader definition that

combines different types of activities, a review of the data suggests that ACLED records a conflict event as a distinct/separate event if it occurs in different locations, leading to duplicates. The January 2017 mutiny, for instance, spread to eight distinct locations, each of which would be included as an individual entry in the ACLED dataset (Raleigh et al., 2010). Although our effort is primarily concerned with identifying distinct events of mutiny, we also recorded location information for each event.[4]

Data collection

Collecting longitudinal data on mutinies is a challenging task, one which few scholars have undertaken. Our data collection first began by utilizing two news databases, ProQuest Historical New York Times and Lexis Nexis Academic. Coders received clear guidelines on the definition of mutiny and used this definition to identify potential instances of mutiny utilizing these databases and additional sources. When coders encountered any confusion on the actors, motives, or distinctions between events, they were instructed to still record these cases. In short, we intentionally included for further consideration any case that could potentially qualify as a mutiny.

In addition, and heeding the call by Demarest and Langer for scholars to carefully reflect on biases in source material, we also assessed region-specific outlets, including *Africa Research Bulletin, Africa Confidential*, and country- or event-specific secondary sources, such as academic books and journal articles (Demarest and Langer, 2018). The results of this initial round of coding left the authors with the "candidate case" batch which the authors then vetted to confirm an event as mutiny or remove it from the dataset. This initial effort resulted in a total of 191 possible cases of mutiny.

Each of the 191 possible cases was then independently reviewed, including reviewing the original source material and seeking new data when necessary to make a final decision as to whether to confirm or omit an event. After reaching individual coding decisions, the authors discussed independent classifications, and in the case of disagreement, consulted all available source material to reach a consensus.

This final exercise yielded 159 events, of which 150 cases of mutiny were confirmed and nine were coded likely, lower-confidence events. We made the decision to qualify our level of confidence in this process as the description of events for several cases was less straightforward.[5] This strategy affords users an opportunity to exclude these low-confidence cases. A *likely* mutiny in Madagascar provides a useful illustration of these types of events. On 22 July 2012, soldiers of the Intervention Forces Regiment began shooting at the Ivato military base for undisclosed reasons. When the government sent an officer to negotiate with the soldiers, he was killed. The soldiers eventually capitulated and were arrested (*Radio France Internationale*, 2012). The motive for the event, while appearing to be an attempt to spoil negotiations between the current and former presidents, was not clear (Greenwood, 2012). Attempting to discern intent from actions, we might assume that since the soldiers did not try to overthrow the government, this case is a mutiny. However, the lack of additional information as to the soldiers' specific motives qualifies our level of confidence, which we denote in the data.

The remaining 32 events from the initial effort were identified as veteran mutinies, national police mutinies, cases of prolonged mutinies coded by others as separate events, and events labeled in other data sources as mutinies for which no corroborating evidence

could be found. Among the cases ultimately excluded from our data, six were found in events datasets, including ACLED, SPEED, SCAD, and Dwyer, for which we could find insufficient corroborating information, ultimately labeled as missing (Dwyer, 2017; Nardulli et al., 2015; Raleigh et al., 2010; Salehyan et al., 2012). Although it was unlikely that every instance of mutiny was captured in our data-gathering procedure, largely owing to reporting biases, we are confident our final sample offers a robust overview of mutinous events across Africa through 2018. We return to this point below with a brief comparison of our dataset with the work of Dwyer.

The dispersion of mutiny

Aside from conflating mutinies with coups, it is also easy to assume that these events coincide both geographically and temporally. Although some coup-plagued countries are also mutiny-prone, this would be an inaccurate categorization. Coup and mutiny event counts, utilizing data on coup attempts from Powell and Thyne (2011), aggregated by country are only correlated at 0.45 and continent-yearly aggregates at 0.23.[6] While some coups directly result from mutinies, and although there are probably theoretical associations between the two, descriptively these events are quite distinct in occurrence. Our reading of cases suggests that out of the 159 mutinies in the data, only eight (5%) escalated into a failed or successful coup (Republic of Congo 1966; Burkina Faso 1983; Sierra Leone 1992; Guinea 1996; Côte d'Ivoire 1999; Côte d'Ivoire 2002; Madagascar 2009; and Mali 2012). Dwyer (2017) codes an additional case of mutiny turned coup in Togo in 1963. However, the initial mutineers in the Togo case were demobilized soldiers protesting their exclusion from the armed forces, while active duty soldiers would go on to assassinate then-President Sylvanus Olympio in a coup (Horowitz, 2000: 482; Houngnikpo, 2000: 219). Variance amongst these distinct events is best illustrated by some countries that lack historical legacies of military coups, yet have experienced mutiny (e.g. Senegal 1999; Cameroon 2015 and 2017).

Temporal trends are illustrated in Figure 1. We report annual mutiny counts for the continent alongside a count of attempted coups (Powell and Thyne, 2011). Aside from an observed spike in both coup and mutiny activity in the early 1990s, our assessment indicates important differences over time. Coups, for example, were far more prevalent than mutinies during the Cold War, while the opposite has become the case after 1990. While some point to an improvement in the continent's civil–military relations in the post-Cold War period, particularly under the African Union, the previous emphasis on coups obfuscates an increasing trend for mutinies (e.g. Powell et al., 2016; Souaré, 2014). Although an appraisal of these mechanisms is beyond the scope of this paper, available scholarship offers some clues. For example, the increased emphasis on combating unconstitutional changes of government could prompt aggrieved soldiers to attempt to remedy their grievances in manners other than by removing the government. The democratic wave that commenced during the 1990s, meanwhile, could allow soldiers to more freely mutiny. Within these democracies, the active nature of civil society and the strategies and tactics employed by civilian organizations in their negotiations with the government served as templates for the military, potentially emboldening them to mutiny in an effort to remedy grievances (Dwyer, 2015b, 2017).

Mutinies have also tended to geographically cluster in West and Central Africa, as illustrated in Figure 2. The most mutiny-prone countries include, unsurprisingly given their history of civil conflicts, Côte d'Ivoire (16) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (16).




Figure 1. Mutinies and coups in Africa, 1960–2018.

Regional standouts Cape Verde, Namibia, Botswana, Mauritius, and Malawi have the distinction of having been both mutiny- and coup-free during the period of investigation. However, much like coups, the vast majority of the continent has experienced mutinies, with strong clusters also occurring in both the Horn and Southern Africa. Such dispersion is important, as it indicates that the phenomenon is not limited to any one particular region. This suggests, for example, that the issues discussed in Dwyer's (2017) work on West and Central Africa are applicable to a wider geographical range. Table 1 reports all instances of mutiny recorded in the dataset, including the day–month–year of the event.

Comparison with Dwyer

In a check of our application of the definition and robustness of our search procedures, we directly compared our efforts with those of Dwyer (2017). Dwyer identified 71 instances of mutiny across a sample of 23 West and Central African states between 1960 and 2014. Our data (right) are illustrated alongside events reported in Dwyer (left) in Figure 3 (2015b, 2017). An identical count for a country does not indicate that all events are necessarily identical across the datasets. As a general rule, however, our decisions regarding events identified by Dwyer are in strong agreement. An important difference is that our collection resulted in 35 additional cases in these countries over the same time period.

Of the 71 mutinies, we documented evidence for 69 of these events. The cases of 1982 Sierra Leone and 1997 Burkina Faso were the only episodes for which we could not find sufficient evidence to justify including the case. A far more common outcome was the




Figure 2. Mutinies in Africa, 1960–2018.

identification of events not previously identified. In total, we found evidence of 35 additional cases of mutiny in the same country-years examined in Dwyer (2017). For example, in April 1999, Senegalese soldiers set up a roadblock to protest unpaid wages from service in a peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic (*PanAfrican News Agency*, 1999). The event is a textbook example of the type of peacekeeping-related mutiny described by Dwyer (2015a, 2017). In another incident, soldiers in Guinea-Bissau blocked roads in Bissau in a mutiny demanding backpay (*Agence France Presse*, 1999).

In seven cases our investigation of an event coded by Dwyer as a mutiny suggested that it did not meet the criteria of a mutiny. In some cases, such as 2000 Côte d'Ivoire, reports suggested that the rebellious individuals were Ivorian civilians and we found no indication of active involvement by current elements of the military (*Africa Research Bulletin*, 2000; Onishi, 2000). Other events, such as 2003 Burkina Faso, featured evidence that was either not supportive of a mutiny or was too ambiguous to definitively categorize it as such. In this case, at least 12 soldiers were arrested for allegedly plotting a coup against President Compaoré (*Africa Research Bulletin*, 2003; *Agence France Presse*, 2003).

The overall consistency in interpretation between these independent data-gathering efforts, involving different search criteria, procedures, and sources, points to the robust nature of the current data. This does not discount the potential for other events to have eluded both efforts owing to reporting bias, and we wish to be specifically clear about this

Table 1. Mutiny in Africa, 1950–2018.

Country	Mutiny	Country	Mutiny	Country	Mutiny
Angola	12/27/1991	Ethiopia	4/26/1974	Mozambique	7/29/1992
Benin	1/28/1972		6/28/1974		8/1/1992
	8/3/1992		7/3/2005		3/30/1993
	1/19/2000		10/11/2018		10/25/1993
Burkina Faso	5/18/1983	Gambia	6/14/1991		12/27/1993
	7/15/1999		2/3/1992		1/19/1994
	10/7/2007	Ghana	1/18/1961		6/6/1994
	3/31/2011		3/29/1980		7/9/1994
	4/15/2011	Guinea	2/2/1996		7/18/1994
	5/14/2011		5/2/2007		7/26/1994
	5/29/2011		5/26/2008		8/2/1994
Burundi	1/9/2009		6/17/2009		2/23/1995
Cameroon	9/9/2015		3/31/2010	Niger	12/1/1963
	6/4/2017		10/26/2009		2/28/1992
Central African Republic	5/15/1993	Guinea- Bissau	3/17/1993		7/10/1993
	5/19/1993		6/8/1998		6/2/1997
	4/18/1996		11/3/1999		2/21/1998
	5/18/1996		12/7/1999		5/30/1998
	11/15/1996		10/6/2004		10/4/1999
	6/20/1997		11/23/2008		11/4/1999
	11/4/2001		12/26/2011		7/30/2002
Chad	8/26/1968	Côte d'Ivoire	5/14/1990	Nigeria	1/15/1966
	9/9/1981		3/28/1993		5/3/1970
	9/20/1991		12/23/1999		8/30/2000
	5/17/2004		3/28/2000		7/5/2008
	9/18/2013		7/4/2000		5/14/2014
Comoros Islands	8/27/2001		9/19/2002		4/11/2018
Republic of the Congo	6/27/1966		12/1/2003		8/12/2018
	1/15/1992		1/2/2006	Sao Tome and Principe	2/10/2014
	2/14/1996		6/28/2008	Senegal	4/8/1999
	2/4/1997		8/18/2008	Seychelles	8/17/1982
	5/6/1997		9/26/2008	Sierra Leone	4/28/1992

(continued)

Table 1. Continued

Country	Mutiny	Country	Mutiny	Country	Mutiny
Democratic Republic of the Congo	7/5/1960	Côte d'Ivoire	11/18/2014	Somalia	2/12/1982
	9/22/1960		1/6/2017		6/19/2010
	7/18/1961		2/7/2017		1/1/2011
	11/1/1961		5/12/2017		12/20/2012
	7/23/1966		12/28/2017		3/12/2017
	7/5/1967	Kenya	1/24/1964		5/24/2017
	9/23/1991	Lesotho	1/23/1994	South Africa	4/22/1997
	10/22/1991		4/14/1994		11/26/2008
	1/29/1993		3/4/1995		8/27/2009
	2/24/1993		9/11/1998	South Sudan	3/5/2014
	9/20/1997	Liberia	4/3/1963	Sudan	10/30/1965
	11/28/1997		12/21/2004		5/15/1983
	1/21/1998		9/22/2008	Tanzania	1/19/1964
	6/16/2009		1/10/2018		1/1/1983
	8/28/2009	Libya	8/7/1980	Togo	6/28/1991
	2/15/2012		1/5/2012		10/22/1992
Eritrea	1/21/2013	Madagascar	3/8/2009	Uganda	1/23/1964
Ethiopia	2/27/1974		7/22/2012		2/19/1977
	3/27/1974	Mali	3/21/2012	Zimbabwe	10/6/2005
	4/7/1974		1/31/2013		11/27/2008
	4/12/1974		9/30/2013		1/20/2009




Figure 3. A comparison of mutiny in Africa, 1960–2014.

point. Occasionally, we found vague references to earlier events. This included both media reports and scholarship, such as Decalo's brief description of a mutiny in Benin (Decalo, 1973). An in-depth review of available sources, however, did not reveal details of the event and thus, was excluded.

Empirical assessment

One major motivating factor for this data collection effort stemmed from the singular focus on coups in the prior civil–military relations literature. As indicated, this predominant focus on coups is understandable given the lack of available data on lesser forms of military insubordination. Yet the ability to measure alternative forms of insubordination can offer scholars a more nuanced and precise understanding of the condition of civil–military relations in a given country. The empirical assessment that follows illustrates the utility of these data by posing two questions. First, we ask if similar factors precipitate differing forms of insubordination, specifically coups and munities. Second, we aim to determine the relationship between a prior history of one form of insubordination on another. Utilizing data on both coups and mutinies, the following analysis first shows that robust determinants in the coup literature (civil–military legacies, anti-coup norms, and military regimes) are not associated with mutinies. Secondly, we uncover that, while prior mutinies are positively associated with future coups, prior coups do not predict future mutinies. In the following sections we describe the data and methods utilized in the empirical analysis.

Dependent variables

We conduct a series of empirical tests using two distinct dependent variables. Our unit of analysis throughout is country-month from 1950 to 2018. In our first set of analyses we utilize *mutiny* as the dependent variable (Table 2). Here we operationalize mutiny as described above, as "an act of *collective* insubordination, in which *troops* revolt against lawfully constituted authority for *primary goals other than political power*" (Dwyer, 2015b; Rose, 1982). Next, we shift our focus to coup attempts as the main dependent variable (Table 3). The data are drawn from Powell and Thyne (2011; 252), who define coup attempts as "illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive." For models utilizing measures of coup successes or failures, we again follow the standard from Powell and Thyne (2011) and define a failed coup as one that did not see plotters seize executive power for seven days or more and successful events as those that did. Each model in Tables 2 and 3 then controls for the effects of time since a specific mutiny or coup event. Given the dichotomous dependent variables, we utilize logistic regression.

Independent variables

Our selection of independent variables reflects our two primary motives: (1) to explore how predominant measures in the civil–military relations literature influence mutinies specifically; and (2) to examine the relationship between a prior history of one form of military insubordination on the other. To address this latter point and control for the effects of a civil–military legacy we utilize five models in each table, where each model controls for a various form of a prior event. We address temporal dependence by including a count of the months since last coup or mutiny event, as well as squared and cubed polynomials. Next, we utilize a measure of real GDP per capita (logged), drawn from the World Bank, to determine if the negative effects of economic development on coup attempts are replicated in the study of mutinies (e.g. Londregan and Poole, 1990). Third, we include a measure for economic growth as prior literature has shown that slowed growth or temporary negative shocks can increase coup attempts (e.g. Kim, 2016). Fourth, past literature has suggested a negative effect of democracy on coups (e.g. Powell, 2012) and we therefore include a dichotomous measure of democracy from the Rulers, Elections, and Irregular Governance (REIGN) dataset (Bell, 2016). Next, to test whether mutinies, like coups, are more likely in states with military regimes, we include a dichotomous measure indicating whether a state was classified as a military regime in a given month, also drawn from the REIGN dataset (Bell, 2016). Finally, we include controls for two time periods. First, we control for the Cold War (1960–1991), as coups are known to have occurred more frequently during this time period. Second, controlling for anti-coup norms associated with regional organizations, we control for the African Union time period.

Results

Table 2 presents the results of our first five models where mutiny is the dependent variable. Each model utilizes a specific measure of time since a prior civil–military event (e.g. coup or mutiny). In model 1 we control for prior mutinies, model 2 controls for prior coup attempts, model 3 for prior successful coups, model 4 for prior failed coups and model 5 for both prior mutinies and coup attempts.

Table 2. Country-month logit of mutinies, 1950–2018.

	(1) Prior Mutiny	(2) Prior Coup Attempt	(3) Prior Coup Success	(4) Prior Failed Coup	(5) Prior Mutiny and Coup Attempt
GDP per Capita	–0.43670**	–0.59542**	–0.59375**	–0.63921**	–0.44569**
	(0.16764)	(0.22638)	(0.21618)	(0.21769)	(0.17075)
Economic Growth	–0.02677*	–0.04963**	–0.05151**	–0.04912**	–0.02359*
	(0.01125)	(0.01465)	(0.01330)	(0.01578)	(0.01095)
Democracy	–0.06535	0.16989	0.14471	0.08945	–0.09980
	(0.18938)	(0.29680)	(0.31058)	(0.31242)	(0.18625)
Military Regime	0.36641	0.08636	–0.05423	0.18361	0.47706
	(0.57226)	(0.84794)	(0.84517)	(0.83227)	(0.62135)
Cold War	–1.35084**	–1.44351**	–1.52978**	–1.46872**	–1.24933**
	(0.32836)	(0.38455)	(0.41662)	(0.39921)	(0.36349)
African Union	–0.34471	–0.43933	–0.43905	–0.47461	–0.35796
	(0.25096)	(0.39819)	(0.41424)	(0.40824)	(0.24572)
Time Since Last Mutiny	–0.03048**	—	—	—	–0.03186**
	(0.00718)	—	—	—	(0.00759)
Time Since Last Coup Event	—	–0.00001	–0.00342	0.00367	0.00641
	—	(0.00634)	(0.00627)	(0.00624)	(0.00438)
Constant	0.09136	0.09136	0.09136	0.09136	–0.14012
	(1.27696)	(1.27696)	(1.27696)	(1.27696)	(1.14172)
Observations	32,684	32,684	32,684	32,588	32,684

Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses.
†$P < 0.1$; *$P < 0.05$; **$P < 0.01$.

Examining Table 2, several trends emerge. First, similar to findings in the coup literature, the effects for both economic development and growth exhibit a negative and significant effect on mutinies. Second, unlike coups, neither military regimes nor regional anti-coup norms illustrate significant effects on the likelihood of mutinies. Further differentiated from coups, the effect of the Cold War time period is negative and significant, suggesting that mutinies were less likely during this era. Third, only in models 1 and 5, when controlling for a history of prior mutiny, does the measure of time since a civil–military event have a negative and significant effect on the occurrence of mutinies. Prior coup attempts, successes, and failures illustrate no statistically significant effect on the occurrence of mutinies in a given country-month. Finally, in model 5 when we introduce controls for both prior mutinies and coup attempts, only the time since mutiny term has a negative and significant effect. As the amount of time since a previous mutiny increases, the likelihood of a future mutiny decreases, but the effect is inconclusive for the time since a coup attempt. This suggests that more work is necessary to understand how attempts to overthrow a regime can impact military mutinies.

Turning to Table 3, we employ a dichotomous measure of coup attempt as the dependent variable and, in similar fashion to Table 2, control for time since various forms of civil–military events across each model. Model 1 controls for prior coup attempts, model 2 for prior successful coups, model 3 for prior failed coups, model 4 for prior mutinies, and model 5 for both prior mutinies and coup attempts. Examining the results, we can see that in model

4 the effect of time since a prior mutiny has a negative and significant effect on the likelihood of a coup attempt. Unlike in Table 2 (models 2–5) where the measure recording the time since prior coup events had no significant effect on mutinies, it appears that as the time since a mutiny increases, the likelihood of a coup attempt decreases. At one year after a mutiny, there is an approximate 2.1% chance of a coup attempt in a given country-year. This decreases to 1.9% at year two and to 1% at 10 years after a mutiny. In other words, coup risk declines by about 53% from year one to year 10. Next, in model 5, time since a coup attempt maintains a negative and significant effect though time since mutiny, while negative, loses its significance (with a *P*-value of 0.12). A final note concerns the lack of significance of a known coup determinant, the Cold War time period. Across all models presented in Table 3 the Cold War variable fails to achieve traditional levels of statistical significance and the coefficient sign is sensitive to model specification. While the Cold War period has been identified as a meaningful predictor of coups in extant literature, several studies do indicate its lack of robustness (e.g. Arbatli and Arbatli 2014; Powell et al., 2016).

In addition to the models in Tables 2 and 3, several alternative model specifications were considered, with the results reported in the Online Appendix. First, Tables A1 and A2 exclude the nine cases that were classified as likely mutinies. Next, Tables A3 and A4 exclude the democracy indicator to address concerns of multicollinearity with the military regime variable. Tables A5 and A6 utilize fixed effects. Finally, Tables A7 and A8 include a new variable labeled

Table 3. Country-month logit of prior mutiny and coup history, coup attempts 1950–2018.

	(1) Prior Coup Attempt	(2) Prior Coup Success	(3) Prior Failed Coup	(4) Prior Mutiny	(5) Prior Mutiny and Coup Attempt
GDP per Capita	–0.26400**	–0.31427**	–0.32425**	–0.35995**	–0.25128*
	(0.09545)	(0.09801)	(0.11034)	(0.11744)	(0.10314)
Economic Growth	–0.01840	–0.02258	0.00640	–0.01532	–0.01831
	(0.02630)	(0.02418)	(0.02175)	(0.01874)	(0.02220)
Democracy	0.09457	0.07455	–0.52079	0.01423	0.00447
	(0.19363)	(0.21990)	(0.36392)	(0.20991)	(0.18829)
Military Regime	0.59139**	0.58464*	0.65940†	1.03475**	0.72240**
	(0.22360)	(0.23725)	(0.35178)	(0.23150)	(0.22788)
Cold War	0.02893	–0.03821	–0.38140	0.12224	–0.07757
	(0.20564)	(0.22454)	(0.27884)	(0.25728)	(0.23231)
African Union	–0.42324†	–0.45048†	–0.69544**	–0.69342**	–0.53523*
	(0.23451)	(0.25348)	(0.26690)	(0.26853)	(0.24347)
Time Since Last Mutiny	—	—	—	–0.00716*	–0.00437
	—	—	—	(0.00345)	(0.00280)
Time Since Last Coup Event	–0.01054**	–0.00804*	–0.00901†	—	–0.00823**
	(0.00312)	(0.00368)	(0.00538)	—	(0.00316)
Constant	–2.36749**	–1.97508**	–2.29511**	–1.76237*	–2.08782**
	(0.67684)	(0.71508)	(0.79475)	(0.89676)	(0.74960)
Observations	32,684	32,684	32,588	32,684	32,684

Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses.
†$P < 0.1$; *$P < 0.05$; **$P < 0.01$.

English speaking to control for potential reporting bias. The variable is dichotomous where 1 = English is either *an* or *the* official language in the country and 0 otherwise. Regardless of the model specification, the results are also robust to those reported in the main analyses (Tables 2 and 3). In an important trend in considering reporting bias, the results consistently demonstrate that English-speaking countries see significantly *fewer* mutinies recorded in our data. While further explorations can provide additional attention to dynamics such as colonial legacies, this preliminary investigation indicates that a reliance on English-language sources did not result in a sample of mutinies disproportionately tilted toward English-speaking states. On the contrary, the data point to the opposite effect.

The empirical exercise above demonstrates the utility of the new data on mutinies and underscores the important differences that arise when considering mutinies as distinct events from coups. While economic indicators such as GDP per capita and economic growth can assist in explaining the likelihood of mutiny, neither predominant determinants of coups (e.g. military regime, Cold War or African Union time periods) nor a history of prior coup activity can help to predict the future occurrence of mutinies. Alternatively, a prior history of mutiny is positively associated with future coups, suggesting that these events can prove to be useful signals for the true condition of a state's civil–military relations.

Future study

This brief description of the data and illustration of its utility accentuates the importance of mutinies in Africa. Mutinies have not only served as precursors to coups (e.g. Sierra Leone April 1992, Mali March 2012), but have also preceded the outbreak of civil war (e.g. Côte d'Ivoire September 2002), have undermined military performance during conflict (e.g. Nigeria May 2014, DRC January 1998), and have threatened the peace following the cessation of civil war (e.g. post-conflict Mozambique experienced nine mutinies from 1993 to 1994). In certain instances, mutinies have been peaceful affairs, with little to no damage to property or harm to people (e.g. São Tomé and Príncipe February 2014). Other mutinies have been accompanied by banditry (e.g. Zimbabwe January 2009), violence against civilians (e.g. Guinea February 1996), and larger unrest (e.g. Central African Republic May 1996). Finally, as illustrated in the empirical tests, known determinants of coups do not have similar effects on mutinies. Perhaps most strikingly, while prior coups do not indicate an increase in future mutinies, prior mutinies are positively associated with future coups.

Given the diversity of outcomes following mutinies, the variance in both scale and tactics employed, and their increasing frequency, scholars would be wise to continue to investigate these events. For instance, while we have briefly illustrated the contribution of the data collection effort by highlighting important differences in the determinants of mutinies and coups, the data can prove useful for both the re-examination of, or new questions on the effects of these different forms of civil–military insubordination as well as their consequences. More work is undoubtedly necessary, but the empirical data and tests presented here offer scholars a wealth of information on mutinies across the African continent and add to the vital foundation established by Dwyer. With this data, future work could examine the types of regimes most susceptible to mutiny and how responses to mutinies impact the future of civil–military relations. This is a key advantage of the dataset that can assist scholars in overcoming the "fallacy of 'coupism'" as we continue to deepen our understanding of civil–military interactions.

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Supplemental material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

1. Those countries which were independent prior to 1950 enter the data in 1950. Those countries which became independent after 1950 enter the data on their date of independence.
2. The 1992 Sierra Leone mutiny is included in the dataset without the "likely" caveat (explained below). While the case required further research to determine that the coup did begin as a mutiny, the motives and actors point to a clear case of mutiny.
3. Upon a request for clarification, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) noted: "Mutineers must be members of the security services who have openly opposed the incumbent regime (through rioting, gun battles with the authorities or attempted coups), yet still identify as members of the military/police. A common mutineer demand would be wages as this demonstrates that they consider themselves servants of the state rather than rebels (e.g. the most recent mutinies in Ivory Coast). Soldiers who displace a leader they perceive as incompetent in order to run the state better would also be counted as mutineers as they still consider themselves part of the state apparatus (e.g. the 2012 Malian coup). If soldiers leave the military and form a separate militant organisation (e.g. as seen during the outbreak of the First Ivorian Civil War or more recently in Burundi), then they are not considered mutineers" (Raleigh et al., 2010).
4. In recording the location of a mutiny we identified and reported the initial location of the mutiny. For mutinies which originated in one city and spread to additional locations, we included additional location information. More information on the location information can be found in the codebook.
5. Of the 159 cases in the dataset, nine are labeled *likely*, suggesting a lower level of confidence in the coding of the event than those identified as confirmed mutinies. Each *likely* mutiny has a note explaining why the case received this classification.
6. Spearman correlation coefficients reported.

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